What's NOT in the IAEA Iran Reports - by Peter Casey: "Zimmerman's piece is seriously misleading in other important respects. He claims that Iran 'has 320 tons of uranium hexafluoride [UF6] gas to feed its centrifuges, enough for almost 100 bombs, but not for even a fraction of one reactor refueling operation.' What he does not mention is that 'all of [the UF6] remains under [IAEA] containment and surveillance' (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 9). He also fails to inform readers that:
* Without enrichment, 320 'tons' of UF6 is no more dangerous than 320 tons of silly putty.
* Since it began to enrich uranium, in February 2007, Iran has fed 3,970 kilograms, or less than four metric tons, into enrichment cascades (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 2).
* To get fissile material, uranium must be enriched to consist of 90 percent U-235. Iran's enrichment levels, however, have never exceeded 4.7 percent U-235, a level that could only be consistent with producing nuclear electricity (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 5). Iran is scarcely 'well on is way' to 'mastery' of U-235 production, despite Zimmerman's claim.
* As have all of its prior reports, the IAEA's May report states: 'All nuclear material [at the two Iranian enrichment facilities] remains under Agency containment and surveillance' (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 4"
* Without enrichment, 320 'tons' of UF6 is no more dangerous than 320 tons of silly putty.
* Since it began to enrich uranium, in February 2007, Iran has fed 3,970 kilograms, or less than four metric tons, into enrichment cascades (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 2).
* To get fissile material, uranium must be enriched to consist of 90 percent U-235. Iran's enrichment levels, however, have never exceeded 4.7 percent U-235, a level that could only be consistent with producing nuclear electricity (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 5). Iran is scarcely 'well on is way' to 'mastery' of U-235 production, despite Zimmerman's claim.
* As have all of its prior reports, the IAEA's May report states: 'All nuclear material [at the two Iranian enrichment facilities] remains under Agency containment and surveillance' (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 4"
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