The War Against the Shia: The West's Strange Bedfellows
January 14, 2013 "Information Clearing House" - It is a ferocious war waged by assassination, massacre, imprisonment and persecution that has killed tens of thousands of people. But non-Muslims – and many Muslims – scarcely notice this escalating conflict that pits Shia minority against Sunni majority.
               
January 14, 2013 "Information Clearing House" - It is a ferocious war waged by assassination, massacre, imprisonment and persecution that has killed tens of thousands of people. But non-Muslims – and many Muslims – scarcely notice this escalating conflict that pits Shia minority against Sunni majority.
The         victims of the war in recent years are mostly Shia.         Last week a suicide bomber walked into a snooker         club in a Shia district of Quetta in Pakistan and         blew himself up. Rescue workers and police were then         caught by the blast from a car bomb that exploded 10         minutes later. In all, 82 people were killed and 121         injured. “It was like doomsday,” said a policeman.         “There were bodies everywhere.”
        Responsibility for the bombing was claimed by the         banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni fundamentalist         group behind many such attacks that killed 400 Shia         in Pakistan last year.
The         dead in Quetta come from the Shia Hazara community,         many of whom migrated from Afghanistan in the last         century. “They live in a state of siege,” says Ali         Dayan Hasan, of Human Rights Watch. “Stepping out of         the ghetto means risking death. Everyone has failed         them – the security forces, the government, the         judiciary.” In this they are little different from         the 30 million Shia in Pakistan who are increasingly         beleaguered and afraid in the midst of a rising tide         of anti-Shia sectarianism.
The         atrocity in Quetta will soon be forgotten outside         the area ,but the victims were not the only Shia         community to come under attack last week. In         Bahrain, where the Shia majority is ruled by the         Sunni al-Khalifa royal family, the high court         confirmed prison sentences – including eight life         sentences – on 20 activists who took part in the         pro-democracy protests in 2011. This happened even         though the original sentences were passed by         military courts using evidence extracted by torture.
The         sectarian nature of what is happening in Bahrain has         never been in doubt. At the height of the crackdown         the Bahraini security forces bulldozed 35 Shia         mosques, husseiniyas (religious meeting houses) and         holy places. The authorities claimed that they were         inspired by a sudden enthusiasm to enforce building         regulations despite the political turmoil.
Sunni-Shia         friction has a long history but took its most         vicious form after the overthrow of the Shah by         Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and the creation of a         revolutionary theocratic Shia state in Iran. The         Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 appeared to end Iranian         hopes of spreading the revolution to its neighbour,         but after the US invasion of 2003 – to the dismay of         the White House and to the horror of Saudi Arabia –         Iraq became a Shia-run state. “We are the first Arab         state to be controlled by the Shia since the         Fatimids ran Egypt 800 years ago,” one Iraqi Shia         activist exulted to me at the time.
As a         result of the Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq in         2006-07, Baghdad became an overwhelmingly Shia city.         The Sunni in the capital increasingly lived in         ghettos. The government, army, police and judiciary         came under Shia control. Across the Middle East, the         Shia appeared to be on a roll, exemplified by         Hezbollah’s success in withstanding the Israeli         attack on Lebanon in 2006. In Afghanistan the         traditionally down-trodden Shia Hazara community         flourished after of the defeat of the Taliban.         However, the overall extent of the Shia success was         exaggerated: in most Muslim countries the Shia form         a vulnerable minority. In the last two years the         Shia revolution has been succeeded by a Sunni         counter-offensive. The Shia democratic uprising was         crushed in Bahrain, and Hezbollah wonders how it         will fare if, in future, it faces a hostile Sunni         government in Damascus. Until a few months ago the         sectarian and ethnic balance of power in Iraq looked         stable, but prophecies of a Sunni takeover in Syria         are having destabilising consequences.
The         uprising in Syria is not so far wholly sectarian,         but is on its way to becoming so. Shia and Alawite         villagers flee as the rebel Free Syrian Army moves         in. A video posted on YouTube shows rebels         ransacking and burning a Shia husseiniya outside         Idlib in north-west Syria.
All         this leaves the US and its Western allies with new         dilemmas. In 2003 the US found that in Iraq it had         opened the door to Iran by overthrowing Saddam         Hussein. Its solution was to try to keep power         itself in Iraq through an old-fashioned occupation,         but this failed disastrously. From 2007 it adopted a         new strategy known by some in the White House as the         “redirection”, making US policy more militantly         anti-Iranian and pro-Saudi and, therefore,         inevitably more pro-Sunni and anti-Shia.
In a         revelatory piece in the New Yorker in 2007, Seymour         Hersh described how this “redirection” has moved         “the United States closer to an open confrontation         with Iran, and, in parts of the region, propelled it         into a widening sectarian conflict between Shia and         Sunni Muslims”. Iran, strengthened by the outcome of         the US invasion of Iraq, was demonised as a greater         threat than the Sunni radicals. Its allies,         Hezbollah and Syria, were targeted for clandestine         operations. Hersh says “a by-product of these         activities has been the bolstering of Sunni         extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of         Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to         al-Qa’ida.”
In fact         the main al-Qa’ida franchises in Iraq and Pakistan         have always been more enthusiastic about killing         Shia than killing Americans. The success of the Arab         Spring movements was in part owing to the new         willingness of Washington to tolerate the Muslim         Brotherhood taking power, judging that this would         not open the door to jihadis seeking to wage holy         war.
The         logic of the US policy of covertly co-operating with         fundamentalist Sunni groups has reached its logical         conclusion. There is now “good” al-Qa’ida on our         side and “bad” al-Qa’ida fighting on theirs. In         Syria, the former operates under the name of the al-Nusra         Front, labelled by the US as the Syrian branch al-Qa’ida,         and is the main fighting force of the rebel National         Coalition. This is recognised by the US, Britain and         many others as the legitimate representative of the         Syrian people.
        Meanwhile, in Mali an advance last week by the         forces of the local al-Qa’ida franchise, of whom we         don’t approve, led to immediate action by the French         army and air force against them. The hypocrisy of it         all is baffling.
                PATRICK         COCKBURN is the         author of “Muqtada:         Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle         for Iraq
       This         article was originally posted at                        Counterpunch
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